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Introduction: Meeting in the Middle
POLITICS IS ABOUT MAKING COMPROMISES. THERE ARE LIMITS TO WHAT
individual decision-makers can do on their own, and to what extent
they can make other actors follow them. These limits make compro-
mises necessary. Making a compromise is to adapt one’s own position
to make it compatible with others in order to reach an agreement
and to embark on a course of action. Some of these adaptations come
relatively easily to the actors involved. Others, however, require sac-
rifices; they hurt.
It is not that the literature does not recognize the pervasiveness of
compromise in politics. The term is widely used across all major
subdisciplines of Political Science, including Comparative Politics,
International Relations, Political Theory and Public Policy Analysis.
Examples include the discussion of the ‘great compromise’ on demo-
cratic representation in the US Federal Convention of 1787, the
‘culture of compromise’ in European Union (EU) decision-making,
or embedded liberalism as the ‘grand compromise’ of the post-war
global order.2 Compromise is evoked in scholarly debates as diverse
1 Putting together this special issue was very much a collaborative effort, which
started with a workshop entitled ‘Meeting in the Middle: Feasibility and Morality of
Compromise in Global Politics’ at the Vienna School of International Studies, 27–28
November 2010. We would like to thank the Vienna School and the Department of
Political Science, University College London for their generous support in funding
this project.
2 Jeremy C. Pope and Shawn Treier, ‘Reconsidering the Great Compromise at the
Federal Convention of 1787: Deliberation and Agenda Effects on the Senate and
Slavery’, American Journal of Political Studies, 55: 2 (2011), pp. 289–306; Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Is
the “Hard Bargaining” Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Perma-
nent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive’, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 36: 4 (1998), pp. 479–504; John G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transac-
tions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, Interna-
tional Organization, 36: 2 (1982), pp. 379–415.
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as normative political theory, deliberative democratic thought and
models of rationalist bargaining.3
However, its frequent mentions in everyday language and schol-
arly debate notwithstanding, the systematic study of compromise
remains surprisingly under-developed. This neglect extends from the
very conceptualization of compromise, from analytical attempts to
uncover and compare the workings of compromise across political
systems and arenas of governance, to normative research on how
compromise ought to be reached and how it ought to look. Our
special issue fills these lacunae by bringing together scholars from all
subdisciplines and some adjacent disciplines of Political Science to
conceptualize, theorize and analyse compromise, and to make the
concept fruitful for the explanatory, comparative and normative
study of domestic, regional and global politics.
To this end, the volume addresses four sets of questions: first, what
is compromise? How does compromise differ from other types of
agreement? How can we identify and compare compromise in
empirical research? Second, what makes compromise possible?
Which ideational and institutional conditions facilitate or hinder
compromise across societies, political systems and arenas of gover-
nance? What strategies for reaching and spoiling compromise are
available to actors? Third, what do compromises do? How do they
affect political decisions and their legitimacy? What repercussions
does the need to compromise have for the process and outcome of
domestic, regional and global governance? Fourth, what makes for a
good compromise? Should we evaluate compromises according to
their substance or according to the process through which they are
reached? How does feasibility factor into moral considerations?
The systematic study of compromise offered in this volume has
relevance for research on a wide range of phenomena across the
Social Sciences. Explanations of compromise and its repercussions in
diverse social, political and institutional contexts will be of interest
for comparativists concerned with legislative decision-making, the
3 Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise,
London, Routledge, 1999; Avishai Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010; M. E. Morrell, Empathy and Democracy:
Feeling, Thinking, and Deliberation, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press,
2010; Christopher H. Achen, ‘Evaluating Political Decision-Making Models’, in Robert
Thomson Frans N. Stikman, Christopher H. Achen and Thomas König (eds), The
European Union Decides, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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merits of different types of democratic institutions, party systems and
coalition government and the governance of divided societies. A
better understanding of different types of (negotiated) agreements
and their institutional and ideational preconditions will also appeal
to those International Relations scholars who investigate strategies of
coping with the complexity of global governance, including the
genesis, legitimacy and effectiveness of international regimes,
European and international negotiations and the resolution of intra-
and interstate conflict. Meanwhile, political theorists working on the
legitimacy of political institutions, democratic theory and decision-
making, as well as liberalism and pluralism, will be interested in the
feasibility and legitimacy of compromise. Finally, strategies for reach-
ing, spoiling and evaluating compromise can inform the analysis of
public policy and attempts to explain and compare policy solutions
found within and across levels of governance, to investigate the link
between decision-making and effective policy implementation, and
to research the ethical dimension of contested public policies.
In what follows, we discuss the rationale for studying compromise
in more detail, review the ‘state of the art’ on compromise in Political
Science, present the conceptualization of compromise that has
guided this volume and introduce the individual contributions.
WHY STUDY COMPROMISE?
There are three very good reasons for studying compromise. First,
compromise is omnipresent in politics. All too often, political scientists
think of agreement in terms of consensus. However, such consensus-
finding is rare in practice: usually, there are many actors on the
political stage, each taking different stances on a given issue. In order
to reach a decision, at least some of these actors have to come to
agree on what to do. Translating this plurality into an agreement is
not an easy task. Given the checks and balances of many modern
polities on the domestic and international levels, actors usually have
to ‘split their differences’ somewhere in the middle.4 The outcome is
an agreement that is neither a consensus nor a capitulation but a
compromise. Actors find a middle ground by making concessions.
4 Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and
Politics, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1990.
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These may be more or less far-reaching. At one end of the spectrum,
there is merely a discrepancy in the preference ordering between an
actor’s original political stance and the compromise agreement. At
the other end of the spectrum, the concessions impinge on an actor’s
taken-for-granted beliefs. Needless to say, there are limits to the
concessions actors are prepared to make. In other words, compro-
mises do not come easily in politics, but they do come more easily
than agreements constituted by consensus.
Second, doing research on compromise pushes us as researchers
into generating explanations that overcome the compartmentalization of
logics of action into rationalist and constructivist strands. Compromises
usually entail a mix of different degrees of concessions. Take, for
example, the 1998 Belfast Agreement between the Republic of
Ireland and the United Kingdom. The Republic dropped its irreden-
tist claim to Northern Ireland in return for a power-sharing agree-
ment in Northern Ireland and a set of all-Irish institutions. For the
Labour government in London, signing this agreement entailed pri-
marily concessions on the level of preferences. Most importantly, the
United Kingdom had always been rather sceptical of all-Irish institu-
tions. For the Fianna Fáil government in Dublin, the agreement
contained a major concession; ever since its origins in the Irish Civil
War, the raison d’être of Fianna Fáil had been to uphold the irredentist
claim. It was only through a painful process of inner-party delibera-
tions that the party eventually signed away this important part of its
identity for the sake of peace on the island. Northern Irish parties
were not signatories of the Belfast Agreement, but, for the most part,
endorsed it. Here, too, the concessions that had to be made were of
a rather painful nature, especially for Sinn Féin and the Ulster
Unionist Party.5
Theoretical frameworks on compromise need to be sufficiently
inclusive to be able to capture the full range of concessions that
actors are prepared to make. The dividing line between rationalism
and constructivism is counterproductive for this endeavour.6 The
former is based on a micro-economic logic of action (logic of conse-
quences). Actors are assumed to weigh costs and benefits in order to
5 The underlying disagreements, however, did not go away, which had serious
repercussions for the implementation of the agreement.
6 Markus Kornprobst, ‘The Agent’s Logics of Action: Defining and Mapping Politi-
cal Judgment’, International Theory, 3: 1 (2011), pp. 70–104.
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figure out what to do. The latter is underpinned by a sociological
logic of action. Actors are assumed to act on reasons that are deeply
ingrained in their identity. This is conceptualized as rule-following
(logic of appropriateness), the outcome of exchanging arguments
(logic of argumentation) and the product of common sense (logic of
practice). For the analysis of compromise, however, rationalism and
preferences alone will not do. Neither will constructivism and iden-
tity; compromises are about preferences and identity as well as the
many ways in which they are linked together. Compromise, therefore,
is a concept that prompts us to engage in a ‘multiperspectival mode
of social inquiry’7 and ‘eclectic theorizing’.8 This is not only impor-
tant for the analysis of compromise; it is equally important for the
study of politics more generally. As long as we over-privilege a certain
narrow scholarly lens at the expense of plausible alternatives, our
research misses important dimensions of political life.
Third, research on compromise is important from a normative
vantage point because it is a kind of agreement that does not deny the
plurality of society.9 Even if understood merely as a counterfactual,
Habermas’s focus on deliberative consensus amounts to a strong
claim.10 In a pluralistic society, reaching such a consensus is – and
ought to be – a difficult enterprise. Compromise is a less far-reaching
kind of agreement that is more appropriate for a pluralistic and
democratic society. Actors do agree on something. But, at the same
time, some measure of disagreement persists. Compromise acknowl-
edges that different life experiences, sorts of moral claims, human
goods and the limitations of our practical reasoning – what Rawls
calls the ‘burdens of judgement’11 – can all lead to reasonable
7 James Bohman, ‘How to Make Social Science Practical: Pragmatism, Critical
Social Science and Multiperspectival Theory’, Millennium, 31: 3 (2002), pp. 499–524, at
p. 502.
8 Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, ‘Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of
International Relations’, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of International Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 109.
9 Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed.
Henry Hardy, London, John Murray, 1990, pp. 17–18.
10 Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns I: Handlungsrationalität
und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1995; Jürgen
Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns II: Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen
Vernunft, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1995.
11 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005,
pp. 55–6.
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disagreements over which collective decisions are the most efficient
or just. Compromises, therefore, are an important part of the answer
to a puzzle that Rawls formulates very well: how is it possible that ‘over
time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines’ exists?12 Compromises – at least those that involve reciproc-
ity among actors, accept the good faith and integrity of others, and
show equal concern and respect to their points of view – go a long way
towards explaining the persistence of such stable societies.13
In short, compromise is at the core of politics. All scholars with an
interest in politics – no matter whether they focus more on the
domestic or the international level, whether they compare political
institutions, democratic decision-making or public policies or
whether they are more inclined to inquire into what is or what ought
to be, or whether they are closer to ontological individualism or
holism – have very good reasons for studying compromise.
COMPROMISE: THE STATE OF THE ART
Given its omnipresence in politics, it is very surprising that compro-
mise remains an under-researched phenomenon. This relative lack of
attention applies to the explanatory-oriented literature even more so
than to normatively oriented research. While the latter has generated
a number of frequently discussed works on compromise,14 the former
merely provides a few scattered clues for how to make sense of the
concept.
By and large, the normative literature has fixed on three main
topics: the coherence of compromise; the legitimacy, justification
12 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 4.
13 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, chapter 4. This is not to say, however, that any
kind of compromise is warranted. Indeed, there are ‘rotten compromises’, made at the
expense of others’ humanity. See Margalit, On Compromise.
14 John Morley, On Compromise, London, Macmillan, 1886; James Pennock and
John W. Chapman (eds), Compromises in Ethics, Law and Politics, New York, New York
University Press, 1979; David Luban, ‘Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on
Negotiation and Informal Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14: 4 (1985),
pp. 397–416. Benjamin, Splitting the Difference ; J. Patrick Dobel, Compromise and
Political Action: Political Morality in Liberal and Democratic Life, Savage, MD, Rowman
and Littlefield, 1990; Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism; Margalit, On Compromise.
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and virtues of a ‘good’ compromise; and the limits of compromise. As
John Morley first noted, compromise is akin to toleration in being
an ambiguous virtue – something that people may accept is often
pragmatically necessary because the alternative is an unacceptable
degree of oppression or excessive concession by one or more of the
parties, but is not of itself necessarily logically coherent or morally
admirable.15 As a result, many have regarded a compromise agreement
as inherently unstable and to a degree wrong. For a just compromise
between two apparently conflicting demands would be no compro-
mise – rather, each party would be agreeing on what was right and
according each element in the so-called compromise its due weight.
Normative theorists of compromise have divided in their views.
Some accept this analysis and regard compromise as normatively
justifiable only if the contingent consequences of not compromising
would be worse than the benefits of enforcing a just solution on the
recalcitrant parties. The issue then is to demarcate when compromise
simply is too costly.16 Others, though, argue that many compromises
result from such cost–benefit analyses being impossible due to the
‘fact of pluralism’ alluded to earlier. In such cases, one should com-
promise not because one’s interlocutor is too strong, selfish or stupid
to be convinced of what is right, with coercion onto the true path
either not feasible or productive of greater wrong, but because there
is no epistemological warrant for imposing one’s view on another –
there simply are different values and perspectives at play, none of
which can be shown to be more valid than the others, and with there
being no way of agreeing what the ideal balance between these
different concerns should be.17 These theorists have tended to look at
the process of compromising – the dispositions needed to achieve it,
the procedures that facilitate it and render it fair, how far principles
as opposed to preferences might be compromised – and whether
willingness to compromise itself sets limits to what can be compro-
mised or how.18
The explanatory-oriented literature neglects the issue of coher-
ence although it appears to be of key importance for accounting for
the implementation of agreements. No matter whether it is the
15 Morley, On Compromise. p. 1.
16 e.g. Simon May, ‘Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy’, Phi-
losophy and Public Affairs, 33: 4 (2005), pp. 317–48.
17 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, p. 114.
18 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, pp. 103–11.
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above-mentioned Belfast Agreement, the grand bargain underlying
the non-proliferation regime, the Kyoto Protocol or, indeed, any
other compromise agreement, the manner in which actors compose
the compromise package has major repercussions for its imple-
mentation and whether it can serve as a foundation for further
agreements.19 By contrast to the neglect of the coherence of compro-
mising, the empirical literature does address the legitimacy of com-
promises. There is contestation on this issue too. On the one hand,
some authors conceptualize compromise as ‘foul’, that is, the morally
questionable outcome of clandestine deal-making by corrupt elites.20
On the other hand, there is the much more positive interpretation of
compromise in the conflict-resolution literature. Here, compromise
is usually equated with reconciliation. This may be a reconciliation
that the parties to the conflict came up with themselves or a recon-
ciliation that is facilitated by mediation.21 There is also contestation
on the third issue, the limits of compromise. This contestation is
predominantly meta-theoretical in nature. Coming from ontological
individualism, authors contend that individuals agree to compro-
mises with others if this helps them pursue their interests.22 Put more
rigorously, a compromise is then a type of Pareto-optimal outcome23
or a Nash equilibrium.24 Coming from ontological holism, though, a
19 Yet there are some leads on this issue in the literature on EU decision-making.
See Jürgen Neyer, ‘Explaining the Unexpected: Efficiency and Effectiveness in
European Decision-Making’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11: 1 (2004), pp. 19–38;
Christine Reh, ‘Consensus, Compromise and “Inclusive Agreement”: Negotiating
Supranational Governance’, in Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst (eds), Arguing
Global Governance: Agency, Lifeworld and Shared Reasoning, London, Routledge, 2010.
20 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, London, Longman, 1972;
Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indone-
sia, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005.
21 Ken Cloke, Mediating Dangerously: The Frontiers of Conflict Resolution, New York,
John Wiley & Sons, 2001; Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, ‘Obstacles to Peace
Processes: Understanding Spoiling’, in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds),
Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, Tokyo, United
Nations University Press, 2006.
22 Carolyn Shaw, Cooperation, Conflict and Consensus in the Organization of American
States, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2004.
23 George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1990, pp. 185–6.
24 Achen, ‘Evaluating Political Decision-Making’; Javier Arregui and Robert
Thomson, ‘States’ Bargaining Success in the European Union’, Journal of European
Public Policy, 16: 5 (2009), pp. 655–76, at p. 657.
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number of writers conceive of compromise as ‘cultural’.25 Actors split
taken-for-granted understandings of the world somewhere in the
middle, for example more liberal and more regulatory postulates
about the world economy.26
In order to overcome the neglect of compromise in the scholarly
literature, it is of crucial importance to let the scattered insights
speak to one another. This is why we have opted for a multi-
perspectival research strategy. This special issue reaches across
paradigms, bridges subdisciplines in Political Science and engages
with approaches from adjacent disciplines. We have cast our net
widely in order to do justice to the multifaceted nature of compro-
mise. At the same time, we have provided our contributors with a
precise but inclusive working definition of compromise – to distin-
guish the concept from other types of agreement, lift the term out of
its everyday usage and make a hitherto loosely employed concept
more fruitful for empirical research and normative evaluation. The
following presents our conceptualization.
DEFINING COMPROMISE
Compromise becomes necessary in situations of conflict between at
least two individual or collective actors. A situation of conflict arises
where ‘incompatible desires, claims, or principles’ clash.27 This clash
can take the form of an ‘open rupture’ between parties;28 alterna-
tively, differences must be resolved to avoid open conflict. The con-
tributions to our volume look at different situations of conflict:
conflict between social, religious and ethnic groups; conflict between
and within political parties in national democracies; and conflict
between states’ goals and principles in regional or global arenas of
25 Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 31.
26 John G. Ruggie, ‘International Response to Technology: Concepts and Trends’,
International Organization, 29: 2 (1975), pp. 557–84.
27 Carrie A. Langner and David G. Winter, ‘The Motivational Basis of Concessions
and Compromise: Archival and Laboratory Studies’, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81: 4 (2001), pp. 711–27, at p. 711II.
28 Theodore M. Benditt, ‘Compromising Interests and Principles’, in J. Roland
Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds), Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics, New York,
New York University Press, 1979, p. 26.
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governance. In a situation of conflict, compromise becomes both
necessary and desirable when the parties stand to ‘gain more (or lose
less) than they would from a failure to reach agreement’29 – be this
agreement a peace treaty, a coalition agreement, a piece of legisla-
tion or an international regime. In short, the need for and the
possibility of compromise arises where two or more actors have con-
flicting individual or collective goals and/or principles, and where
these actors stand to benefit more from reaching an agreement or
embarking on a course of action than from maintaining the status
quo.
As one possible outcome in a situation of conflict, a compromise is
situated on a continuum stretching from consensus on the one hand
to dissensus on the other. On this continuum, we identify consensus
and compromise as outcomes that solve a conflict, and controversy
and dissensus as outcomes that maintain the status quo (Figure 1).
Parties to a consensus are persuaded by their agreement, to which
they subscribe without regrets. A consensus results from a delibera-
tive process which leads at least one party – but often both – to
change its goals or principles through interacting with others and
appealing to valid norms.30 As a reasoned response to a political or
social question, a consensus not only resolves the situation of con-
flict itself; the reasons for conflict will also have been deliberated
away.31 Dissensus is at the opposite end of the spectrum and main-
tains the status quo: parties may have tried to reach agreement,
29 Joseph H. Carens, ‘Compromises in Politics’, in J. Roland Pennock and John W.
Chapman (eds), Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics, New York, New York University
Press, 1979, p. 126.
30 Erik Oddvar Eriksen, ‘Reflexive Supranationalism in Europe: On the Cogs and
Wheels of Integration’, in Erik Oddvar Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl
(eds), Law and Democracy in the Post-National Union, Oslo, ARENA, 2006.
31 Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns I.
Figure 1
Situations of Conflict
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but they failed to do so; or desires, claims and principles are too
incompatible to make an attempt to go beyond the status quo pos-
sible. In between dissensus and compromise sits controversy. Like dis-
sensus, controversy does not solve the situation of conflict, yet,
unlike dissensus, controversy entails the continued attempt to do so.
Parties may disagree about the possible path to agreement and
about the possible content of agreement, but they recognize each
other’s competing desires, goals and principles, and are willing to
face their disagreement.
Compromise, like consensus, is placed on the ‘solution side’ of the
spectrum. Compromises can come in different varieties, but they all
share three defining features. First, for an outcome to qualify as a
compromise, all parties to an agreement have to make concessions.32
Such concessions can be of different kinds, including splitting dif-
ferences when bargaining, convergence on a ‘second best’, or issue-
linkages in a package deal.33 Second, concessions made for the sake
of a compromise must be voluntary rather than coerced; they
cannot be extracted in a condition where, ‘being left with no
reasonable alternatives, we do, against our better judgment,
what others want us to do.’34 Third, compromise will not do away
with underlying controversy. Compromise requires a willingness to
concede, but the grounds for the conflict (if not the conflict itself)
persist.35
In spite of sharing these three core features, compromises differ
in the mix and quality of these features; as the following sections
show, compromises differ, more specifically, in how mutually gen-
erous, costly or painful concessions are, in whether all forms of
coercion are absent, and in whether the grounds for conflict are
transformed.
32 Margalit, On Compromise, p. 20.
33 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, pp. 103ff.
34 Margalit, On Compromise, p. 91. ‘Mutual concessions’ and ‘non-coercion’ are
defining features of what Margalit calls ‘sanguine compromise’. See Margalit, On
Compromise, pp. 48–54.
35 Richard Bellamy and Martin Hollis, ‘Consensus, Neutrality and Compromise’, in
Richard Bellamy and Martin Hollis (eds), Pluralism and Liberal Neutrality, London and
Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 1999, p. 64; Martin P. Golding, ‘The Nature of Compromise:
A Preliminary Inquiry’, in Pennock and Chapman, Compromise in Ethics, p. 13; Albert O.
Hirschman, ‘Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society’, Political Theory,
22: 2 (1994), pp. 203–18, at p. 214.
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Concessions
Concessions are a familiar feature in the literature on bargaining,
negotiation and conflict resolution. Indeed, if parties attempt to solve
a conflict in the absence of a win–win solution, actors must concede
something – a claim, a goal, a principle or even a deeply held belief.36
Compromises require concessions to be mutual ; yet, even mutual
concessions can be of different kinds.
In bargaining theory, concessions are made in a context where the
structure of the game, the payoff matrix and the players’ strategic
possibilities are well-defined. Conceding is part of strategic rational-
ity: everyone tries to maximize gains, and all players know that this
is what everyone else is trying to do. In such a context, concessions
are minimal, strategic moves; they are necessary to strike a deal and
will only be reciprocated to reach ‘agreement within a bargaining
range’.37
The concessions made to reach a compromise can, however, be
more demanding on the actors; depending on the type of compro-
mise reached, concessions will need to be generous, costly and
social. First, to reach a compromise, all parties need to concede;
they need to adjust their claims and positions (if not their underly-
ing preferences and values) so as to facilitate accommodation.38 This
will also be the case where – given asymmetrical preferences, exit
options and bargaining resources – agreement could have been
reached on the basis of unilateral concession. Second, the conces-
sions made for a compromise are costly and sometimes painful.
Each party gives up a claim or a goal that it would have preferred to
retain, with some compromises even requiring parties to sacrifice
their deeply held beliefs for the sake of an agreement. In short, to
reach a compromise, everyone has to let go of ‘something dear, but
not invaluable, in order to gain something truly invaluable’,39 or, as
Edmund Burke put it, parties have to ‘balance inconveniences’.40
36 Langner and Winter, ‘The Motivational Basis’, p. 711II.
37 Margalit, On Compromise, p. 39.
38 Benditt, ‘Compromising Interests’, p. 26; Margalit, On Compromise, p. 20.
39 Quoted in Benditt, ‘Compromising Interests’, p. 45.
40 E. Burke, ‘Speech on Conciliation with America’ (March 1775), in I. Hampshire-
Monk (ed.), The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke, Harlow, Longman, 1987, p. 126.
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Third, such generous and costly concessions do not simply facilitate
a deal in a bargaining range but serve a wider social function.
Making concessions for a compromise becomes part of constructing
a ‘shareable good’,41 of re-describing ‘what is in dispute’,42 and of
accommodating all parties around the table.43 Such socially ‘thick’
concessions are possible because the other side’s interests and
values are considered as ‘matters to be met rather than constraints
to be overcome’.44
In sum, the concessions made for a compromise require that all
parties give something up; yet, compromises differ according to how
costly and potentially painful the concession is, and by how much
more parties give up than their preferences, strategic possibilities and
payoffs would require (Figure 2).
Non-Coercion
The concessions made for the sake of compromise are voluntary
rather than coerced. Yet, just as the nature of concessions can
range from the minimal, pain-free and strategic to the generous,
painful and social, so the process through which concessions are
extracted can stretch from individual gain maximization to mutual
accommodation.
At one end of the spectrum stand bargained concessions. Such
concessions are extracted non-coercively, but here ‘more for one
41 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, p. 101.
42 Margalit, On Compromise, p. 50.
43 Daniel Naurin, ‘Why Give Reason? Measuring Arguing and Bargaining in Survey
Research’, Swiss Political Science Review, 13: 4 (2007), pp. 559–75, at p. 562.
44 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, p. 101.
Figure 2
Concessions
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means less for the other’.45 Actors play a competitive game, attempt-
ing to extract concessions and to maximize gains rather than trying
to find inclusive solutions.46 In this game, success hinges on asym-
metrical bargaining power, grounded either in material capabili-
ties,47 or in different preference intensities, exit options and
alternatives to negotiated agreement.48 The difference between posi-
tions may be split equally in the ensuing compromise – but only if
bargaining resources are distributed equally.49
In contrast to consensus, compromises are not built on a ‘synth-
esis’. But compromises need not be driven by strategic rationality
and gain maximization only. They can also be based on a logic of
cooperation; this logic is, in turn, grounded in the ‘willingness to
confer recognition on one’s rival’.50 At the other end of the spectrum,
therefore, sit concessions whose voluntary and non-coercive nature
goes deeper: it is the goal of the compromise agreement to maximize
wants in a way that accommodates the preferences of all parties. In
defining such a goal, actors are strategic but cooperative; in realizing
it, communication is characterized by cooperation, rich information-
sharing and openness.51 Agreement will thus be built through the
furthest possible accommodation of concerns. Underlying the co-
operative logic of such a compromise is not just non-coercion but
‘recognition’,52 ‘moral acknowledgement’53 and ‘respect’54 for the
‘opponent’ and for her claims, principles and beliefs.
In sum, the concessions behind a compromise will always be vol-
untary, but the non-coercive process through which they are reached
can stretch from a competitive focus on individual advantage to a
cooperative focus on mutual accommodation (Figure 3).
45 David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for
Cooperation and Competitive Gain, New York and London, Free Press, 1986, p. 119.
46 Naurin, ‘Why Give Reason?’, p. 563.
47 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita James Morrow and Ethan Zorick, ‘Capabilities, Per-
ception, and Escalation’, American Political Science Review, 91: 1 (1997), pp. 15–27.
48 A. Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics’, International Organization, 51: 4 (1997), pp. 513–53.
49 Margalit, On Compromise, p. 48.
50 Ibid., p. 41.
51 Naurin, ‘Why Give Reason?’, p. 563.
52 Margalit, On Compromise, p. 41.
53 Golding, ‘The Nature of Compromise’, p. 16.
54 Benditt, ‘Compromising Interests’, p. 26.
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Continued Controversy
As argued above, a compromise – like a consensus – offers a solu-
tion to a situation of conflict; all parties to a compromise make
concessions, and these concessions are extracted in a non-coercive
process of accommodation. Yet, in contrast to a reasoned consen-
sus, a compromise cannot do away with the underlying grounds for
controversy. Compromises therefore come with regrets. Parties to
an agreement prefer the outcome to the status quo, but they are
fully aware of the costs they need to bear to reach and uphold the
agreement.
Yet, while continued controversy and perceived costs unite all
compromises, compromise agreements differ in whether and how
they can transform the grounds for conflict, even if they cannot
negotiate them away. A compromise reached through minimal,
pain-free and strategic concessions has little potential to elucidate
or transform the reasons for a particular conflict. However, where a
compromise has to result from mutually generous, costly and social
concessions, actors need to exchange, explain and understand
their goals, principles and beliefs. They also need to trust each
other’s willingness to concede reciprocally. The process of
cooperation, recognition and communication required to reach
such a compromise has the potential to elucidate the grounds
underlying the conflict, and such elucidation can, in turn, change
actors’ perceptions of the conflict itself, even if the reasons for
conflict persist.
In sum, while all compromises contain continued controversy – or
a ‘splash’ of disagreement – the processes through which different
compromises are reached vary according to how the grounds for
conflict are transformed, albeit persisting (Figure 4).
Figure 3
Non-Coercion
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OVERVIEW
In response to the omnipresence of compromise in politics and the
surprising lack of its systematic study, we have invited scholars from
all major sub-fields of Political Science as well as from adjacent dis-
ciplines such as Social Psychology to contribute to this special issue.
The result is a truly multi-perspectival volume that links the study of
compromise to core questions of Political Science, including: democ-
racy, justice and political representation; conflict resolution in plu-
ralist societies; European and global governance; international
security; and the legitimacy of political decisions. Our contributors
focus on different types of compromising actors, reaching from indi-
viduals and groups over governments and political parties to states
and international organizations, and they look at the preconditions
for compromise, the process of reaching compromise and the impact
of compromise across arenas of governance. Covering analytical,
theoretical and normative perspectives and reaching across sub-
disciplines, this volume thus offers a multi-perspectival and compre-
hensive yet targeted take on the politics of compromise at the
national, European and global level.
More specifically, the individual contributions address the follow-
ing issues: In ‘Predictors of Compromise over Social and Political
Issues’, Ananthi Al Ramiah and Miles Hewstone provide a social
psychological analysis of the neglected issue of ‘intergroup compro-
mise’. Al Ramiah and Hewstone discuss the factors that promote the
willingness to compromise with two very different outgroups: homo-
sexuals and Muslims. They develop a framework in which altruistic
motivations (such as empathy) and egoistic motivations (such as trust
and symbolic threat) act as proximal predictors of compromise, and
intergroup contact acts as a distal predictor. Based on a new dataset,
Figure 4
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Al Ramiah and Hewstone find that respondents who had more posi-
tive contact with homosexuals perceived them to be less threatening,
felt more empathy towards them and, in turn, were more likely to
compromise with them on group-specific issues. Al Ramiah and Hew-
stone also find that respondents who had more negative contact with
Muslims perceived them to be more threatening and, in turn, were
less likely to compromise with them. These results are discussed with
reference to recent developments in intergroup relations and the
state of public discourse in contemporary Britain. The article is also
linked to the wider implications for intergroup relations in pluralistic
contexts, and makes suggestions for future research on actors’ will-
ingness to compromise with outgroups.
Entitling her contribution ‘The Warden’s Dilemma: Self-Sacrifice
and Compromise in Asymmetric Interactions’, K. M. Fierke explores
how, given a situation where compromise is seen by actors to be
inappropriate – either because they understand their opponents to
be ‘terrorists’ or themselves to be the victims of injustice – agents
would move towards a new game, in which both sides are recognized
as political subjects capable of engaging in compromise and negotia-
tion. Fierke argues that compromise requires an autonomous subject
and a relational world in which the autonomy of both parties is
acknowledged. The possibility of compromise thus rests on a new
game in which both sides are recognized as such. In its theoretical
approach, Fierke’s article reconceptualizes the notion of a ‘game’ by
shifting away from the individualist ontology of game theory to a
social ontology focused on underlying rules of the game. She turns
the common game metaphor, the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, on its head,
and develops the ‘Warden’s Dilemma’, which highlights the hierar-
chical structure of the prison and the strategic dynamics of asym-
metrical conflict in a context of this kind. Empirically, Fierke
explores the hunger strikes in Northern Ireland in 1980–81 and the
martyrdom of Solidarity’s priest, Jerzy Popieluszko, a few years later.
Markus Kornprobst writes about ‘How Rhetorical Strategies
Reproduce Compromise Agreements: The Case of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Regime’. Being rooted in mutual concessions, it can
never be taken for granted that compromises, once agreed on, stay in
place. Contestation about compliance is something that is very much
to be expected and does not inevitably destabilize a compromise.
Kornprobst contends that whether such a destabilization occurs or
not depends on how actors communicate with one another, more
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precisely on what offensive and defensive rhetorical strategies they
employ to make themselves heard. Probing his framework with an
analysis of the foundational compromise on which the nuclear non-
proliferation regime is built, Kornprobst finds evidence for his theo-
retical framework. The parties have tended to stay away from heavy
rhetorical artillery and stuck to less robust rhetorical strategies. This
played a crucial role in making the compromise – and with it the
nuclear non-proliferation regime – persist.
In ‘Grand Compromises in Global Governance’, Steven Bernstein
looks at the two ‘grand compromises’ that have underpinned
efforts to build a stable global order since the Second World War:
‘embedded liberalism’, a compromise between laissez-faire liberalism
and domestic interventionism, and ‘sustainable development’, a com-
promise between the global North and South. Bernstein compares
these two ‘grand compromises’ and the challenges resulting from the
twin economic and climate crises of the early twenty-first century; he
asks whether ‘embedded liberalism’ and ‘sustainable development’
can be characterized as compromises or rather reflect hegemony;
and he assesses whether the two compromises have bolstered or
challenged the legitimacy of global governance.
Peter Jones and Ian O’Flynn inquire into the normative dimen-
sions of compromise in divided societies. In ‘Internal Conflict, the
International Community and the Promotion of Principled Compro-
mise’, they discuss the conditions under which the international
community can promote compromise between parties to internal
conflict. To do so effectively, Jones and O’Flynn argue, the interna-
tional community ought to treat principled rather than pragmatic
compromise as its default position. Dictated by considerations of
principle rather than by mere strategy, such compromises ought
to be preferred for reasons of stability, inclusion and democratic
deliberation.
In ‘European Integration as Compromise: Recognition, Conces-
sions and the Limits of Cooperation’, Christine Reh discusses the role
of compromise in legitimizing supranational governance and the
limits to compromise in the European polity. She argues that the EU
– a divided, multilevel and functionally restricted polity – is highly
dependent on the legitimizing force of ‘inclusive compromise’,
which works through the recognition of difference. This is true for
horizontal or micro-level relations between political actors (where
compromise works through concessions and perspective-taking in a
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process of ‘procedural accommodation’), and for vertical or macro-
level relations between systems of governance (where compromise
works through obtaining ‘constitutional compatibility’). Given the
legitimizing force of inclusive compromise, Reh subsequently identi-
fies the limits to such compromise and, thus, to supranational coop-
eration; these limits are issue specific and depend on who bears the
costs of cooperation.
In his contribution on ‘Democracy, Compromise and the Repre-
sentation Paradox: Coalition Government and Political Integrity’,
Richard Bellamy explores how far politicians can compromise
without compromising either themselves or those they represent.
Compromise may be the life blood of politics, yet it is often vilified as
undermining democracy. If a politician has been elected on a given
mandate, does compromise involve a betrayal of those who have
elected them? If a politician holds certain principles, how far can they
be compromised before he can be accused of sacrificing integrity for
power? It is sometimes argued that the only way for politicians to
avoid these dilemmas is to compromise over policy rather than prin-
ciples, and to do so for pragmatic rather than moral reasons. Bellamy
shows that neither of these arguments proves tenable. Policies are
defined by principles, and a compromise between principles has to
be achieved in a principled way, in which each party to the compro-
mise recognizes the moral standing of the other. However, far from
being opposed to democracy, the search for a principled compro-
mise is itself mandated by democratic norms, for the willingness to
accept democratic decisions is in many ways the model of a prin-
cipled compromise. Meanwhile, representatives can have the demo-
cratic authority to compromise on their voters’ behalf, for their
mandate rests not so much on espousing a set of policies per se as on
embracing the principled reasons that underlie them. Indeed, their
electoral appeal rests on their reasoning as their electors do. So
long as their compromises reflect this reasoning, then they can be
regarded as legitimate. He illustrates these arguments through an
analysis of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition Agreement
following the 2010 British general election.
Finally, Philippe Van Parijs reflects on what distinguishes a ‘good’
from a ‘bad’ compromise. In his article ‘What Makes a Good Com-
promise?’, he explores the question from two perspectives: first, as
a philosopher of justice who considers questions of justice and
compromise to be inextricably linked; second, as a Belgian citizen
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socialized into compromise as a ‘spécialité locale’. In his contribu-
tion, Van Parijs explores three distinct definitions of a ‘good com-
promise’: it is honourable and allows all parties to save face; it is
considered fair and equal by all parties; it is a Pareto-optimal
improvement on the status quo. Examples from Belgian history and
politics illustrate the argument.
CONCLUSION
Compromise comes in different forms and reflects different norms,
depending on the views and dispositions of those involved, the
circumstances in which they find themselves, and the issue they
need to resolve. Compromise is an ineliminable feature of plural-
istic and complex societies, in which uncoerced collective agree-
ments are required among individuals and groups with conflicting
or incompatible and often incommensurable values, interests and
modes of reasoning. Compromise can be easy and difficult, prag-
matic or moral, involve mutual satisfaction or the more demanding
mutual accommodation, be merely Pareto-optimal or fair and
equitable, be strategic or transformative. Compromises of different
types can be good, bad, ugly or rotten. All compromise tends to be
messy. However, as the individual contributions show, compromise
need not be either incoherent or immoral. Politicians no less
than citizens can compromise without compromising themselves,
coming in the process to a fuller appreciation of each other and of
themselves.
From the pork barrel politics of Tammany Hall, to the appease-
ment of Munich and the disappointments of Kyoto and Copenhagen,
compromise is often seen as signalling the shortcomings of politics.
Compromise epitomizes a world of shady deals and dirty hands,
where promises are made to be broken and everyone and everything
has its price. Against this common view, we have suggested that a
fuller understanding of the sources, types and modalities of compro-
mise produces a nobler and more edifying picture of the political
process. On this account, to meet in the middle need not involve
half-measures, a lack of commitment, or even corruption and dishon-
esty – although all these are possible. At its best, compromise also
offers the possibility of a more attractive vision of politics, as enabling
citizens to share a collective good that would be unknown and
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unobtainable on their own.55 That it provides the means to do so in
a realistic way, without idealizing the motivations of those concerned
or minimizing the depth or persistence of the conflicts and disagree-
ments that divide them, strikes us as perhaps the most appealing
aspect of the politics of compromise.
55 We paraphrase here Michael Sandel’s famous plea for ‘the possibility that when
politics goes well, we can know a good in common that we cannot know alone’
(M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1982, p. 183). However, we follow Henry Richardson in regarding compromise as
providing a less romanticized version of that possibility than Sandel’s communitarian
civic republicanism (H. Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends
of Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 153).
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